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OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES

MEMORANDUM

Soviet Treaty-Making in the Third World

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7 July 1972

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

7 July 1972

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Treaty-Making in the Third World*

Since May 1971 the Soviet Union has signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with Egypt, India, and Iraq. This memorandum seeks to set forth the relevant facts, to consider these new formal agreements in perspective, and to address three interrelated questions: (a) What are the implications for Soviet relations with those countries and with their neighbors? (b) Does this activity represent a consistent pattern or a new development in Soviet foreign policy? (c) Are other such treaties in prospect?

* *This Memorandum was produced in the Office of National Estimates and coordinated within CIA.*

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Soviet Treaty-Making in Context

1. These three treaties fall into a special category, but a rather restricted one. The Soviet Union has treaties of "friendship and good-neighbor relations" with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey which date back to the early 1920s; it also has a "friendship" treaty with Yemen (San'a) signed in 1964.* In addition, there is a treaty of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance" -- the term also used for the bilateral treaties among the Soviet bloc countries -- with Finland, signed in 1948 and extended in July 1970 for 20 years more. Thus the treaties with Egypt, India, and Iraq are, along with the Yemen treaty, the USSR's only ones with noncontiguous, noncommunist countries.

Origins of the Three Treaties

2. Particular circumstances obtained in the formation of each of these three treaties, and on this account they do not entirely fit a single pattern. Our best information regarding the Soviet-Indian agreement (Annex B) is that it stemmed from an offer

* A 1925 USSR-Turkish "friendship and non-aggression" treaty was denounced by the USSR in 1945. The Soviet government had signed a treaty of "friendship and trade" in 1928 with the then Mutawakkalite Kingdom of Yemen -- an agreement which the 1964 treaty presumably supplanted.

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made by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko, with Politburo approval, in March 1969. The Soviets at that time apparently were in some consternation regarding the Sino-Soviet border clashes and were particularly eager to obtain India's diplomatic support against China. For their part, the Indians were receptive to the idea because they thought it might lead to the reduction or cessation of Soviet aid to Pakistan. But for various reasons, including Mrs. Gandhi's desire to select the most suitable time for springing this surprise on the Indian public, and (possibly) a few second thoughts in Moscow about the treaty, nothing was done until August 1971. By that time Mrs. Gandhi had won her election, the crisis with Pakistan was nearing a flashpoint, the Indians apprehended an unfriendly US stance toward them, and both the Indians and Soviets were nervous about Sino-US detente. Result: the treaty.

3. Our information on the Soviet-Egyptian treaty (Annex A) indicates that, as with India, the Soviets were the instigators. Some of the gossip in Cairo after the treaty was signed in May 1971 had it that in 1970 the Soviets tried unsuccessfully to gain Nasser's approval of the idea. The Soviets may indeed have made such an attempt. In any case it is clear that after Nasser's death the Soviets detected several signs that Sadat was drifting to the "right"

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in domestic policies and away from the "anti-imperialist direction" in foreign policy; more specifically, that he was negotiating with the US on his own in the interests of an acceptable Egyptian-Israeli settlement. Accordingly, Moscow pressed for the treaty as a useful way of counteracting these threats to Soviet influence. For his part, Sadat probably believed that his acceptance of the treaty would help to ensure continuing Soviet economic, military, and diplomatic support.

4. In contrast to the other two signatories, Iraq, early this year, asked for its treaty (Annex C). Baghdad apparently reckoned that it would enhance the regime's domestic prestige and its reputation in the Arab world -- at least among the radical Arabs. Moreover, Baghdad supposed that it might lead to an increase in Soviet military and economic aid, especially aid to Iraq's production and marketing of oil. Not least of all, the Iraqis believed, it could transform the USSR's benevolent neutrality in the simmering Iraq-Iran dispute into something much more benevolent and less neutral. The Soviets, for their part, apparently pressed Iraq hard on three matters:

-- to include Communist Party members in the Iraqi regime
and to involve the Party in the major political
organization;

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- to provide some form of access to Iraqi support facilities for Soviet naval forces;
- and to consult with the USSR prior to initiating hostilities with another country (read: Iran).

The Iraqi regime has in fact taken on Communist Party members in certain positions; whether or not commitments were made on the other two issues is not yet clear.

Textual Differences

5. While the treaties are similar in language, they are not identical. Publicly (and predictably) the Soviets have stressed the common features. For example, on 13 June, during the Supreme Soviet's pro forma debate over the treaty with Iraq, Chairman Podgorny commented that the three treaties together "represent a new, practical embodiment of the strengthening link and expanding interaction of world socialism with the forces of national liberation". Privately, the Soviets have acknowledged that there are important differences, at least in tone. They apparently regard their treaty commitments to Iraq, and India's commitments to them, as least binding, and the mutual ties between Moscow and Cairo as the strongest. This interpretation is borne out by certain distinctive formulations in the published texts, e.g.:

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- The Egyptian treaty spells out the question of Soviet military assistance; the Iraqi text refers only in general terms to cooperation in the strengthening of "their" defense capabilities; the Indian treaty contains no equivalent language.
- Both the Egyptian and Iraqi treaties refer to the coordination, or concerting, of foreign policies, whereas the Indian text urges only "mutual cooperation"; moreover, the Iraqis are given less leeway than the Egyptians to decide whether and when consultation with the Soviets is required.
- India's "nonalignment" and "independence" are recognized by the Soviets; in contrast, both Egypt and Iraq in effect allow for the preservation of Soviet influence in their countries by agreeing to cooperate with the USSR in preserving their "socio-economic gains".
- The desirability of Soviet-Iraqi cooperation in the development of Iraqi oil resources is specifically mentioned, though the language does not bind the

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Soviets to render any specific aid to the Iraqis in this area (the UAR treaty mentions only "natural resources", whereas the Indian treaty limits itself to a general statement, common to all three treaties, regarding "economic, scientific and technological cooperation").

Implications for Bilateral Relations: India

6. The effects of the treaties on Moscow's relations with the signatories, and with their neighbors, have been mixed. In India, the more articulate critics of the treaty picked a bad time to state their objections -- i.e., after Parliament had ratified the treaty but before the outbreak of the war. Critics chose this moment to lace otherwise cogent arguments with some very bad predictions: the treaty would not lead to any increase in Soviet military aid and diplomatic support for India; and the USSR might use the treaty as a means of preventing India from taking appropriate military measures against Pakistan. Subsequent events have muted virtually all criticisms of the new arrangement with the USSR.

7. Indian goodwill and gratitude toward the USSR could be dissipated under certain circumstances. India now regards

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itself, with reason, as the dominant voice on the subcontinent, and yet the USSR also desires to extend its influence in the area. Indian and Soviet policies toward Bangladesh are broadly parallel at present, but the Indians are quite wary of Moscow's long-term objectives; there could be, at the least, serious misunderstandings if the Soviets were seen by the Indians to be establishing some sort of military arrangement or to be meddling in Dacca's internal politics. The expected growth of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, even if it does not lead to the establishment of Soviet bases as such near India's shores, may jar Indian sensitivities about outside intrusions. Beyond this, India may conclude that its security from external threat has improved to such a degree that India no longer requires the kind of close association with another country implied in the treaty.

8. Avoiding these potential sources of friction in its relationship with Delhi entirely will require Moscow to show a sense of pace and subtlety -- the latter quality not always characteristic of Soviet diplomacy. If they are wise, the Soviets should, for example, bring themselves to go through the ritual of consulting the Indians in advance of any new moves in Bangladesh. They should forego asking for one or two naval facilities in the Indian Ocean until the West is seen by the Indians to have

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established three or four. They should offer the Indians more action on the world scene; in other words, Moscow is likely to find the Indians better disposed to the spread of its influence in South Asia if, at the same time, the Soviets encourage a larger Indian voice in Asian affairs. (There are signs that they have begun to urge the Indians to be more active diplomatically in Southeast Asia.)

Iraq

9. In addition to whatever advantages the Soviets may have derived from the negotiations which led up to the Iraqi treaty, the treaty itself serves longer-term Soviet goals in the region. For example, the Soviets have referred to the Iraqi treaty as a factor which, in conjunction with the Egyptian treaty, promotes the "consolidation" and "development" of Soviet-Arab relations as a whole. (General Secretary Brezhnev himself made this point in his speech to the Soviet trade union congress in April, just after the Soviet-Iraqi treaty was signed, and Party Secretary Ponomarev repeated it in June, as the treaty was brought before the Supreme Soviet for formal ratification.) The Soviets, in other words, probably expect that the achievement of a second treaty with an Arab state will help to persuade the Arab states generally that close association with the USSR is the wave of their future.

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10. This Soviet expectation may or may not prove realistic in the case of Syria. The Soviets have apparently been seeking a friendship treaty with Syria for some time, and no doubt hope that the Iraqi treaty will encourage Damascus to favor a similar agreement. And, indeed, some Syrians acknowledge that pro-treaty forces in Damascus may have been strengthened somewhat by the signing of the Iraqi treaty. But Syrian opponents of close association with the USSR have also become more active of late, and Damascus Radio announced on 16 April that Syria was not at the moment contemplating the signing of a treaty with the USSR.

11. Other important radical Arab states seem less than pleased about the Iraqi treaty. Libya not only criticized it publicly, but withdrew its ambassador from Baghdad for a short period. Moreover the Libyans evidently asked for and received Algeria's prior approval before expressing their displeasure. Indeed, Algerian foreign ministry officials have since maintained that only the "delicacy" of their government's relations with the USSR prevented it from joining in the public denunciation of Iraq. And despite a recent improvement in the overall climate of Iraqi-Egyptian relations (which may owe something to Soviet prodding of the Iraqis), some Egyptian officials have professed annoyance at

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what they regard as Iraq's effort to challenge Egypt's primacy of place among the USSR's Arab allies.

12. Among non-Arab states in the area, Iran is naturally the most concerned. Evidently the Soviets have tried in various ways to reassure Teheran that the treaty is not aimed at Iranian interests, but these reassurances would sound hollow indeed if the Iranians began to observe qualitative improvements in Iraqi weaponry and particularly if they witnessed the establishment of a Soviet naval facility at the head of the Persian Gulf. At a minimum, the Iranians are apprehensive that the Soviets may intend to enter into serious competition with them for influence in the Persian Gulf.

Egypt

13. The Soviet-Egyptian treaty must present a very mixed picture to the Soviets at this point. Since the treaty Sadat has in fact moved to curb some officials critical of Egypt's pro-Soviet alignment. He has also made efforts to mediate between the USSR and the rather anti-Soviet regimes in Libya and the Sudan. In these respects Sadat has acted in a manner consistent with the treaty, if not necessarily as a consequence of it. Of course the main

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argument in favor of the treaty, from Moscow's point of view, may be a negative one: the tensions that exist in Soviet-Egyptian relations might have become considerably worse if there had not been some formal check on Sadat's behavior. But this may not be a very persuasive argument nowadays. Occasional scenes between Soviet and Egyptian officers, and the persistent, often public, criticism of Soviet behavior expressed by Egyptian officials and journalists may suggest to some Soviets that the bilateral relationship has actually deteriorated since the treaty.

14. Indeed, the day may come when the Soviets see the treaty itself as an irritant in the relationship. The treaty may have raised Egyptian expectations that the Soviets will somehow be able to break the deadlock with Israel. As it becomes clearer that they will not or cannot do so, Egyptian resentment will surely intensify. Moreover, the treaty may encourage Sadat to go out of his way to prove in various ways that he is not simply a Soviet puppet.

A Pattern for the Future?

15. Whatever the Soviets' misgivings about these three treaties, they have apparently decided that formal undertakings of this sort can be a useful adjunct to overall Soviet foreign policy

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aims. They have, according to reports from a variety of sources, expressed an interest in signing additional treaties. The Soviets can be expected to keep trying in various ways -- e.g., aid offers -- to persuade the Syrians to sign a treaty; President Asad can expect Soviet pressure to sign a treaty on his trip to Moscow in July. Moscow may, moreover, have suggested the idea of a friendship treaty to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and to officials in Bangladesh as well.

16. The Soviets have also invited Yugoslavia to sign a "general friendship" treaty. That they would do so, knowing full well that there was virtually no chance that Tito would accept, implies that Moscow sees some virtue in the mere proposal. It presumably hopes that in time the recipients (in this instance Tito's successors) can be persuaded to sign up, and that in the interim they will view such offers as signs of Soviet goodwill. It is clear, then, that in certain circumstances the Soviets see both the proposals and the treaties themselves as useful diplomatic

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instruments and as yet another way to help expand the international influence of the USSR.*

17. But presumably there is a limit to the list of candidates in the Third World. The Soviets must be aware that signing too many friendship treaties would tend at best to cheapen the value of existing treaties, and at worst to embroil the Soviets in local conflicts where they stand to lose more than they gain. Accordingly, we do not expect the Soviets to try to sign treaties with the smaller, strategically less important states in the Middle East and South Asia, nor with states at great distance from the USSR; i.e., in Latin America or Black Africa. Israel and Pakistan, as hostile neighbors of treaty states, are not likely to be suitable candidates.

18. As Moscow weighs the general question of legal ties to the Third World, several considerations no doubt enter the calculation. First of all, the Soviet government probably views the treaties as a means of preserving the significant political progress it has made in this arena. Beyond this, Moscow presumably

* A quite different order of Soviet considerations, but nevertheless an indication of the current set of Soviet mind is reflected in Moscow's interest in establishing legal relationships of one sort or another with even those states in opposing alliance systems; e.g., the non-aggression treaty with Bonn, the proposed friendship treaty with Turkey, and the expressed desire to improve the "juridical" relationships with France, Canada, and the US.

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sees them as one more way of maintaining momentum -- or at least an impression of momentum -- for its whole array of efforts to project influence there. All the states which have signed treaties to date are "progressive", if not "socialist", and on many international issues Moscow has received more support from these capitals than from many Communist Parties. The Soviets may believe that the treaties will help to perpetuate this happy circumstance. Moreover, they may hope that if any of these regimes are overthrown or otherwise replaced, the successors may feel more bound to the Soviets, because of the treaty, than otherwise would have been the case. The other parties to the treaties, of course, may not share this view.

19. A second consideration is that the Soviets may believe that the treaties serve to underwrite the extensive economic and military aid commitments they have made with these countries. A treaty will not force a client to pay its debts if it has exhausted its treasury. But perhaps the Soviets believe that the spirit of the treaty may reduce friction in the day-to-day administration of these aid agreements. Moreover, the Soviets may reckon that the treaties will discourage recipient states from accepting aid from competing sources, particularly Chinese aid, which nowadays usually can be had on far more generous terms. In any case, it is a fact that Egypt, India, and Iraq stand 1-2-3 on the list of active

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recipients of Soviet military aid among the Less Developed Countries, that Egypt and India are 1 and 2 on the economic list, with Iraq not far behind, and that certain potential treaty signatories, especially Syria and Algeria, are also high on both lists.

20. Finally, this tendency to deal formally with Third World states may be particularly congenial to the collective leadership. Khrushchev's habit was to arrange matters personally with the Sukarnos, Nkrumahs, etc. If the bilateral relationship sooner or later proved disadvantageous to the USSR, it was held against him as another of his "harebrained schemes". The members of the Politburo may prefer to have the USSR's general obligations embodied in a formal state document at least partly in order to protect themselves personally. Not to spin the thread too fine, it may be worth noting that the Soviets arranged procedures so that each of the three treaties under discussion was signed by a different Soviet official. Perhaps no one in the Kremlin wishes to risk his prestige on the success of all of them.

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ANNEX A

USSR-UAR TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP
AND COOPERATION, 27 MAY 1971

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic,

Being firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all-around cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic meets the interests of the peoples of both states and helps strengthen world peace,

Being inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and for the freedom, independence and social progress of the peoples,

Being determined to wage persistently the struggle for stronger international peace and security in accordance with the invariable course of their peaceable foreign policy,

Reaffirming their allegiance to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Being driven by a desire to consolidate and strengthen the traditional relations of sincere friendship between the two states and peoples through concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation and thus creating a basis for their further development,

Agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare that unbreakable friendship will always exist between the two countries and their peoples. They will continue to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and all-around cooperation between them in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in the internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit.

ANNEX A

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a socialist state and the United Arab Republic, which has set itself the aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines, will cooperate closely and in all fields in ensuring conditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples.

Article 3

Being guided by a desire to contribute in every way toward maintaining international peace and the security of the peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic will continue with all determination to make efforts toward achieving and ensuring a lasting and fair peace in the Middle East in accordance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

In pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy, the high contracting parties will come out for peace, relaxation of international tension, achievement of general and complete disarmament and prohibition of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Article 4

Being guided by the ideals of freedom and equality of all the peoples, the high contracting parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will continue to come out against imperialism, for the full and final elimination of colonialism in pursuance of the U.N. declaration on the granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples, and wage unswervingly the struggle against racialism and apartheid.

Article 5

The high contracting parties will continue to expand and deepen all-around cooperation and exchange of experience in the economic and scientific-technological fields -- industry, agriculture, water conservancy, irrigation, development of natural resources, development of power engineering, the training of national personnel and other fields of economy.

ANNEX A

The two sides will expand trade and sea shipping between the two states on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and most-favored nation treatment.

Article 6

The high contracting parties will further promote cooperation between them in the fields of science, arts, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, physical culture and other fields.

The two sides will promote wider cooperation and direct connections between political and public organizations of working people, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquaintance with the life, work and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 7

Being deeply interested in ensuring peace and the security of the peoples, and attaching great importance to concertedness of their actions in the international area in the struggle for peace, the high contracting parties will, for this purpose, regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states.

In the event of development of situations creating, in the opinion of both sides, a danger to peace or violation of peace, they will contact each other without delay in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing peace.

Article 8

In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the United Arab Republic, the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in the training of the

ANNEX A

U.A.R. military personnel, in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to stand up to aggression in general.

Article 9

Proceeding from the aims and principles of this treaty. Each of the high contracting parties states that it will not enter into alliances and will not take part in any groupings of states, in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties declares that its commitments under the existing international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of this treaty and it undertakes not to enter into any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 11

The present treaty will be operative within 15 years since the day it enters into force.

If neither of the high contracting parties declares a year before the expiry of this term its desire to terminate the treaty, it will remain in force for the next five years and so henceforth until one of the high contracting parties makes a year before the expiry of the current five-year period a written warning on its intention to terminate it.

Article 12

The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of exchange of ratification instruments, which will take place in Moscow in the nearest future.

ANNEX A

The present treaty is done in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, with both texts being equally authentic.

Done in the city of Cairo on May 27, 1971, which corresponds to 3 Rabi' as Sani, 1391, Hejira.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

N. PODGORNYY.

For the United Arab Republic.

ANWAR SADAT.

ANNEX B

INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP,
AND COOPERATION, 9 AUGUST 1971

Desirous of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

Believing that the further development of friendship and cooperation meets the basic national interests of both the States as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world,

Determined to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international tensions and the final elimination of the remnants of colonialism,

Upholding their firm faith in the principles of peaceful co-existence and co-operation between States with different political and social systems,

Convinced that in the world today international problems can only be solved by co-operation and not by conflict,

Reaffirming their determination to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

The Republic of India on the one side and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side, have decided to conclude the present treaty, for which purposes the following plenipotentiaries have been appointed;

On behalf of the Republic of India: Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister of External Affairs.

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs who, having each presented their credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples. Each party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The high contracting parties shall continue to develop and

ANNEX B

consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and comprehensive co-operation existing between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles, as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.

Article 2

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the high contracting parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

Article 3

Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and nations, irrespective of race or creed, the high contracting parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The high contracting parties shall co-operate with other States to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

Article 4

The Republic of India respects the peace-loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.

ANNEX B

Article 5

Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching great importance to their mutual co-operation in the international field for achieving these aims, the high contracting parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both the States by means of meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

Article 6

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological co-operation between them the high contracting parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet trade agreement of Dec. 28, 1970.

Article 7

The high contracting parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

Article 8

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

ANNEX B

Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other high contracting party.

Article 9

Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

Article 10

Each high contracting party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more States, which is incompatible with this treaty. Each high contracting party further declares that no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other party.

Article 11

This treaty is concluded for the duration of 20 years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either high contracting party declares its desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other high contracting party 12 months prior to the expiration of the treaty. The treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this treaty.

ANNEX B

Article 12

Any difference of interpretation of any article or articles of this treaty which may arise between the high contracting parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one.

On behalf of the Republic of India.

SWARAN SINGH

Minister of External Affairs

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

A.A. GROMYKO

Minister of Foreign Affairs

ANNEX C

USSR-IRAQ TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND
COOPERATION, 9 April 1972

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic!

Firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all-round cooperation between them accords with the national interests of both states, serves the cause of peace in the whole world and in the area of Arab countries, the interests of the freedom of the peoples, their security and respect of sovereignty.

Believing that the strengthening of the cohesion of all forces of peace and progress, including the consolidation of the unity of Arab states, on an anti-imperialist basis is an important means of struggle for lasting peace and international security.

Inspired by ideals of struggle against imperialism, colonialism, zionism and reaction, for the freedom, independence and social progress of the peoples.

Convinced that the present-day world international problems should be solved by way of cooperation and the search for mutually acceptable solutions.

Confirming their peace-loving foreign policy and loyalty to the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations organizations.

Wishing to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship, cooperation and mutual trust, striving to raise these relations to a new, even higher level, have decided to conclude the present treaty and agreed on the following:

ANNEX C

Article 1

The high contracting parties declare that inviolable friendship will exist between the two countries and their peoples and all-round cooperation will develop in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields on the basis of respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each others internal affairs.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic declare that they will closely and comprehensively cooperate in ensuring conditions for preserving and further developing the socio-economic gains of their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each of them over all their natural resources.

Article 3

The high contracting parties, consistently pursuing the policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, in accordance with their peace-loving foreign policy will further come out for peace in the whole world, for easing of international tensions, for the attainment of general and complete disarmament, encompassing both nuclear and conventional arms under effective international control.

Article 4

Proceeding from the ideals of freedom and the equality of all the peoples, the high contracting parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

They will further conduct an undeviating struggle against imperialism and Zionism, for a full, final and unconditional liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid, come out for the speediest full implementation of the United Nations declaration of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

ANNEX C

The sides will cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for their sovereignty, freedom, independence and social progress.

Article 5

Attaching much importance to economic, technical and scientific cooperation between them, the high contracting parties will further expand and deepen this cooperation and exchange of experience in industry, agriculture, irrigation and water conservancy, in the working of oil and other natural resources, in the field of communications and in other branches of the economy as well as in the training of national cadres. The sides will expand trade and shipping between the two states on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and most favoured nation treatment.

Article 6

The high contracting parties will facilitate a further development of ties and contacts between them in the field of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, cinematography, television, tourism, sport and in other fields.

With the aim of securing a fuller mutual acquaintance with the life, labour and achievements of the peoples of both countries in various fields the sides will facilitate an expansion of cooperation and direct ties between state bodies and public organizations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions of both states.

Article 7

Attaching much importance to concerted actions on the international scene in the interests of ensuring peace and security and also to the development of political cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the high contracting parties will regularly consult each other at various levels on all important international questions concerning the interests of both states, as well as on questions of further developing bilateral relations.

ANNEX C

Article 8

In the event of the origination of situations threatening the peace of any of the sides or creating a threat to peace or violating peace, the high contracting parties will immediately contact each other with the aim of coordinating their positions in the interests of removing the threat or restoring peace.

Article 9

In the interests of the security of both countries the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening of their defense capabilities.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties declares that it will not enter alliances or take part in any groupings of states, as well as in actions or undertakings directed against the other high contracting party.

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to permit the use of its territory for any act capable of inflicting military damage to the other side.

Article 11

The two high contracting parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of the present treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 12

The present treaty is concluded for a period of 15 years and will be automatically prolonged for each subsequent five-year period if any of the high contracting parties does not express its desire to terminate twelve months before the expiration of the treaty.

ANNEX C

Article 13

Any differences that may arise between the high contracting parties concerning the interpretation of some provision of the present treaty will be resolved bilaterally in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

Article 14

The present treaty is subject to ratification and will enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which will be effected in Moscow in the shortest possible period of time.

The present treaty is done in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, both texts being of equal authenticity.

Done in Baghdad on April 9, 1972, this according with the 25th Safar, the 1392 year of the hegira.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A. KOSYGIN

For the Iraqi Republic

A. H. AL-BAKR

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